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ABSTRACT 
An increasingly important debate has emerged around the extent to which techniques 
such as the standard gamble, which is used, amongst other things, to value health states, 
actually serve to construct respondent’s preferences rather than simply elicit them.  
According to standard theory, the variant used should have no bearing on the numbers 
elicited from respondents i.e. procedural invariance should hold.  This study addresses 
this debate by comparing two variants of standard gamble in the valuation of health 
states.  It was a mixed methods study that combines a quantitative comparison with the 
probing of respondents in order to ascertain possible reasons for the differences that 
emerged.  Significant differences were found between variants and, furthermore, there 
was evidence of an ordering effect.  Respondents’ responses to probing suggested that 
they were influenced by the method of elicitation.   
 
 
Keywords: preference construction, anchoring effects, ordering effects, standard 
gamble, health valuation 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Standard Gamble (SG) method asks respondents to compare a certain outcome with 
a risky gamble, which will result in a better outcome if the gamble pays off and a worse 
outcome if it does not.  The method can be used to value anything from wealth to 
health.  In valuing health, an individual is presented with an intermediate health state, 
hi, and asked to find a point of indifference between this state with certainty and a 
gamble with a p* chance of a better outcome (usually full health) and a 1-p* chance of a 
worse outcome (often this is death).  If full health and death are set to one and zero, 
respectively, then, according to the axioms of expected utility theory (EUT), hi = p.   
 
The SG response therefore yields a cardinal index measuring an individual’s utility 
under uncertainty (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).  This index is unique up to a 
positive linear transformation and therefore provides an interval scale. The axiomatic 
basis of SG in the classical theory of decision-making under uncertainty seems highly 
relevant to medical decisions, and this has led to it being regarded by many health 
economists as a ‘gold standard’ amongst valuation techniques in health care (Mehrez 
and Gafni, 1993; Drummond et al., 1997).   
 
However, there is a considerable body of evidence in relation to prospects involving 
wealth, and an increasing amount of evidence in the field of health, which raise serious 
doubts about the descriptive validity of the restrictions imposed by EUT (Schoemaker, 
1982; Loomes, 1993; Oliver, 2003).  Notwithstanding this, the SG has become one of 
the main techniques for putting the ’Q’ into the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY), 
which combines health state values and duration into a single index number (Dolan, 
2000) and which is now widely used to compare health care interventions.  Over the 
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years, a number of different variants of the SG have been developed and, if people’s 
preferences are not as well constructed as standard economic theory would suggest, it is 
not at all clear that different variants will generate the same values.  
 
A criticism of the current methods for eliciting preferences using techniques such as SG 
is that the tasks are cognitively complex, with respondents being asked to consider 
variations in numerous attributes simultaneously across choices involving at least three 
scenarios, with the added complexity of probabilistic information.  Evidence from 
psychology would suggest that respondents faced with such complex problems would 
tend to adopt simple heuristic strategies (Lloyd, 2003).  This would be particularly true 
where the respondents have little time to consider their real underlying values.  A 
worrying concern that has emerged from the psychology literature is that techniques 
such as SG may actually construct respondent’s preferences in some way rather than 
simply eliciting them (Slovic, 1995). This would suggest that the precise wording of the 
SG question might influence the answers given.  
 
Over the last 30 or so years different variants of the SG have been developed in order to 
assist the respondent as much as possible and promote standardisation through the use 
of different elicitation procedures, the use of visual aids and different methods of 
administration.  While such development of methods might be regarded as laudable, it 
does raise the question of whether different variants result in systematic differences.  
EUT does not suggest one variant of SG should be preferred to another and, indeed, the 
precise framing of the question should not influence the result as, according to EUT, 
people have well-constructed preferences.  If elicitation techniques do construct 
preferences, however, then one consequence is that the values they obtain from 
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respondents will be influenced by factors extraneous to the health states being valued, 
such as the framing of the question.   
 
This study compares two variants of the more widely used variants of SG in the health 
and transport economic literatures.  The study compared the ‘ping pong’ method, based 
on a method developed by Furlong and others (1990) and the ‘titration’ method, first 
used in a study to value injury states by Jones-Lee and colleagues (1993).  The aim was 
to test the hypothesis that these techniques elicit preferences and therefore there should 
be no systematic difference between them. The study was specifically concerned with 
the valuation of a set of health states.  It was a mixed methods study that combines a 
quantitative comparison with the probing of respondents in order to ascertain possible 
reasons for any apparent inconsistencies in health state values from using one variant 
compared to the other. 
 
2. METHODS 
 
2.1 Participants 
The participants were recruited from staff and students at the University of Sheffield 
Medical School. No payment was offered to the participants in this study. A research 
assistant was given a list of names of staff and students at the institution and then 
randomly drew names from the lists.  Once recruited respondents were randomised 
between each of two groups who completed different questionnaires.  The same 
research assistant who had been trained by the authors interviewed each respondent.    
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2.2 The Variants 
2.2.1 The ‘ping pong’ variant 
The ping pong variant (PPV) is administered by interview and employs a visual aid 
where the probabilities are displayed on a board, both numerically and in the form of a 
pie chart.  A key feature of this variant is that the probability of success is presented in a 
‘’ping pong’ fashion that oscillates up and down the scale.  The respondent is asked to 
choose between the ill-health state for certain compared to the uncertain prospect of a 
risky treatment, where the outcomes are full health and some worse outcome.   
 
The first question asked respondents to consider this choice where the probability of 
success is set at 1.0. This is a test question is to ensure the respondent understands the 
health state classification. Should they choose the certain intermediate state over being 
in full health for certain, they are asked the reason for this. Such a choice is rarely made. 
The probability of the best outcome is then changed to 0.1.  Should the respondent 
choose the uncertain treatment, then the assumed indifference value is 0.05.  If they 
choose the certain ill health state then the probability of success is increased to 0.9.  
Should the respondent then choose the certain prospect, he/she would be asked to 
explicitly consider the probability of the best outcome being 0.95. Where the respondent 
continues to choose the certain prospect, then the interpolated value for indifference is 
0.975 and where the respondent chooses the uncertain prospect, the value is 0.925.  
 
A respondent who chooses the uncertain prospect at a probability of 0.9 would be asked 
to consider the choice with a 0.2 chance of success. Choosing the certain prospect 
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would then result in the respondent being asked to consider a probability of 0.8. This 
procedure continues in a ‘ping pong’ fashion until the respondent’s point of indifference 
is revealed. The probabilities are presented in units of 0.1 except for 0.95, which 
generate values on a scale from 1.0 to zero in intervals of 0.05 (except for 0.975). 
 
The board is designed to ensure each interview is standardised in order to minimise the 
risk of interviewer variation. The board and pie chart are also designed to help the 
respondents understand the notion of probability.  The developers have tried and tested 
the procedure over many years and it has become widely used in health economics, 
including the valuations of two of the leading generic instruments, the Health Utility 
Indices-3 and the SF-6D (Feeney et al, 2002; Brazier et al, 2002).   
 
2.2.2 The titration variant 
For the titration variant (TV), the chances of success are listed from 100 in 100 down to 
0 in 100 in intervals of 5, which generates a scale from 1.0 to zero in intervals of 0.025.  
It is usually self-completed following instruction from the interviewer.  Respondents are 
asked to place a tick against all the probabilities of success at which they are confident 
they would choose the treatment and a cross against all the values where they would 
reject the treatment.  They are then asked to indicate the chances of success at which 
they would find it most difficult to choose.  Where this region covers more than one 
probability value, then a mid-point is taken to be the indifference value.  This version of 
SG has been found to produce more consistent and reliable data than an interview based 
variant using props, though not the PPV used in this study (Dolan et al, 1996).  
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In summary, as their names suggest the variants differ in terms of their procedure for 
finding the indifference probability value.  However, they also differ in the way they are 
administered (i.e the PPV is interviewer administered and TV is seclf-completed witht e 
interviewer in attendance) and in the use of props (i.e. PPV has props, whereas the TV 
does not).  Both instruments generate indices on the same zero to one scale, with PPV 
generating a distribution of scores with 0.05 intervals, except at the top end where there 
is an additional value of 0.975 (due to respondents being offered 0.95), and  TV 
generates intervals of 0.025. It is possible for differences within individuals of 0.05 to 
arise due to ‘rounding’.   
 
2.3 The interviews 
In both groups respondents were asked to complete the SF-6D, a health state 
classification developed from the SF-36.  The SF-6D describes health across six multi-
level dimensions: physical functioning, role limitations, social functioning, pain, mental 
health and vitality (Brazier et al, 2002).  Health states are defined by the SF-6D by 
taking one level from each dimension, an example of which is shown on Figure 1.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Respondents were asked rank eight SF-6D health states, and then rate them using a 
visual analogue scale, where the endpoints are the best and worst imaginable health 
state. The eight health states were full health, the worst state defined by the SF-6D and 
six intermediate states worst health state defined by the SF-6D (Table 1).  These health 
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states were selected to represent a range of states from very mild through to severe 
states defined by the SF-6D.  The six intermediate states have been selected in pairs, 
where each pair of states differed in a single level of one dimension.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
This closeness of the three pairs has been designed to examine consistency across 
methods. For each pair of health states, one state can be regarded as logically better or 
worse than the other.  One state will dominate over another where is better on one 
dimension level and no worse across the other dimensions.  The health states were 
selected in adjacent pairs in order to scrutinise the consistency of respondent’s 
valuations that differ by one level in one dimension.  A health state is represented on 
Table 1 by 6 digits, where each digit indicates the level for each of the six different 
dimensions.  One pair is health state Z (211211) and  state X (211212) and the codes 
indicate that state Z is better in vitality than state X and no worse on any other 
dimension and so should dominate it.  For the other pairs the logical ordering is Q>Y 
and T>R.   
 
Respondents were asked to also value each of the six intermediate states and the worst 
(or ‘pits’ state), P, by SG. Each group valued these states in the same order.  Group 1 
valued the first four states using PPV (including P) and then valued the remaining three 
states valued by the TV variant (Table 1).  Group two valued the first four states by TV 
and the other three by PPV.  All respondents were interviewed by the same research 
assistant who had been trained in the two methods by the authors in the use of the 
variants.  
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The six intermediate states were valued in gambles containing the best state defined by 
the SF-6D and the worst state P as the uncertain outcomes.  P was then valued against 
full health and death. 
 
At the end of the interview, respondents were asked their gender, age, employment and 
educational status. They were then asked to comment on the questionnaire. Where 
inconsistencies occurred in their valuations of states between the three pairs of states (Z 
and X, Q and Y and T and R), respondents were asked to comment on the reasons for 
them.   Respondents were then asked how difficult they found each variant and how 
well they understood the tasks using five point likert scales.   
 
2.4 Analysis 
 
The results reported in this paper focus on mean health state values by variant and 
respondent Group.  The significance of any differences found is tested at the 5% level 
using the t-test. An important check on the extent to which respondents were able to 
understand the valuation tasks was to examine the logical consistency of their responses 
and this has been presented in terms of strict inconsistency, which is where there is a 
reversal of rank from the logical ordering of the states. Differences in the answering the 
questions on degree of difficulty and understanding were tested using the Wilcoxon 
rank test. 
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3. RESULTS 
A total of 58 respondents were recruited from staff in the Medical Faculty at the 
University of Sheffield.  There were 28 respondents in Group 1 and 30 in Group 2.  The 
groups were comparable in terms of gender (9 males in group 1 versus 10 males in 
group 2), age (38 vs. 36) and own health status according to a VAS rating (0.88 vs. 
0.88). The two groups ranked the states in a very similar order and their VAS ratings of 
the states were virtually the same with no significant differences (Table 2).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The mean SG health state values are shown on Table 3 by variant and group.  Mean 
health state values generated by the TV variant are higher than those produced by the 
PPV for health states Y, Z, R and P.  The differences are .107, .038, .130 and .138 
respectively and all are significant except Z.   For states X, Q and T there are little or no 
difference between the variants.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
The differences between the variants can also been seen in the number of times 
respondents choose to take no risk (i.e. p=1.0), which was 25 for TV compared to 6 for 
PPV out of a possible 203 occasions for each variant across the 58 respondents.   
 
In terms of consistency with the logical ordering across the three pairs of states (i.e. 
Z>X, Q>Y, T>R), the pattern is mixed (Table 4).  The mean VAS values are consistent 
across all three pairs.  However, for the mean SG values there was inconsistency within 
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variant and between variant.  Strict inconsistencies arises between Z and X within the 
PPV variant and between Q and Y for TV.  Between variant inconsistencies was 
measured within group, since each group valued the same states but used different 
variants.  Therefore, Group 1 was inconsistent between Z (PPV) and X (TV) and Group 
2 between Q (TV) and Y (PPV).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
In terms of difficulty, most respondents found the two variants between quite difficult 
through to fairly easy (Table 5).  Only one person found either technique very difficult.  
However, the responses indicate a significant difference in favour of the PPV.  In terms 
of understanding the tasks, most respondents said they fully understood the tasks for 
both the variants, but again there was again a small and significant difference in favour 
of PPV (Table 6).  
 
[INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE] 
 
Respondents with inconsistent responses were asked to comment on why they thought 
the difference arose.  Twenty-four people responded to this question.  The most 
common reason given by respondents was confusion, including finding it ‘hard to 
remember’ and ‘forgot’. A number of respondents thought the tasks might have been 
responsible for the difference: the ‘board leads to more risk taking – more attractive’ 
and the PPV ‘yo’s, yo’s you around whereas TV makes you more cautious’.  Some 
apparent inconsistencies were 0.05 or less and arose due to differences in the scale.   
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Finally, respondents were asked whether there were any other differences between the 
variants.  The most common comment (n=16) was that they found using the board 
easier and many liked the visual aid provided by the PPV (n=7).  A smaller number of 
respondents (n=4) commented that they found the PPV props confusing and offering 
only a limited number of choices (n=2). 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
The SG is based firmly on the axioms of EUT and is widely used to value health states. 
According to EUT is does not matter which variant of the method is used as people have 
well-constructed preferences.  But the evidence from this study does not support the 
hypothesis that these two variants of SG produce the same answers.  Overall, it would 
seem that TV tends to generate higher health state values than PPV.  For four of the 
states the differences were in excess of the 0.03 suggested in the health economics 
literature as being potentially important (O’Brien and Drummond, 1996) and for three 
states exceeded 0.1. This could have a potentially important impact on results of the 
final incremental cost per QALY of an intervention.   However, this result was only 
clear for four out of the seven states.  For three states the differences were very small 
and two of these were in the opposite direction.  These mixed results suggest that there 
may be more than one reason for the differences found.   
 
The four states where TV exceeded PPV were also the first states valued by each group.  
This suggests that the valuation of the second set of states may have been contaminated 
in some way by the valuation of the first four states.  The first four states represent a 
‘pure’ comparison of variants whereas the other three states have been altered by the 
task that went before.  This would suggest that in Group 1 the TV valuations of the last 
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three states were lower than would otherwise be the case since they were ‘dragged 
down’ by the respondent’s memory of the valuation of the first four states by PPV.  For 
Group 2, the PPV valuation of the last three states were ‘dragged up’ by the TV 
valuation of the first four states.  The net effect of this contamination from the ordering 
of the variants is to offset the impact of the variant effect. 
 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
results in preferences that are influenced by the provision of different anchors and is 
caused by respondents making insufficient adjustment away from the starting point. 
Such starting point biases have previously been found in a range of contexts, including 
assessments of probabilistic information (Kahneman, 1992), contingent valuation 
questions (Boyle et al, 1997) and distributional questions (Dolan and Robinson, 2002).  
It seems that they may also have influenced the results reported here. 
 
The combination of variant and ordering effects helps to explain some of the anomalies 
in the inconsistency results.  Within Group, the variant effect explain the inconsistencies 
of X>Z and Y>Q (see Table 4).  In group 1, state X was valued by TV and Z by PPV 
and in group 2 state Y was valued by TV and Q by PPV.  Of course the differences are 
quite modest because the ordering effect has substantially negated the variant effect. 
Within variant, the inconsistencies of X>Z and Y>Q have arisen from ordering effects.  
States X and Q occur in the second half of the interview where the valuation has been 
contaminated by the previously used variant, for example the PPV values of X increased 
from having TV valuations first.    
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The fact that TV values exceed PPV values could be explained by anchoring since TV 
starts eliciting preferences at the upper end of the scale, whereas the PPV iterates 
respondents between the upper and lower ends, thereby reducing any anchor point bias.  
An alternative view, expressed by some respondents, was that the ping pong procedure 
actually confuses people and encourages them to take risk.  This is supported by the 
finding that that a significantly lower proportion respondents chose a probability of 
success of 1.0 with PPV compared to TV.   
 
This may arise from respondents completing PPV being encouraged to gamble at the 
start of the task by the question that asks them to decide between a 100% chance of 
ending up in full health or the chronic state for certain.  People realise that the ill health 
state is worse than full health and therefore say they would prefer full health, but then 
they thrown to the other end of the scale with a 10% chance of hull health versus the 
certain state.  Whereas they regarded the chronic state as only slightly worse than full 
health and may have preferred to take a much smaller risk than is being offered.  By 
contrast, the TV allows people to concentrate at the upper end and may decide on 
further consideration to choose 1.0 out of the risks being made available or the next one 
down. However, TV can be criticised for anchoring values at the top end. 
 
In more general terms, this study supports a view that people’s preferences for 
intangible things like health are quite labile and can be influenced by the problem 
structure, question format or other aspects of the assessment process rather than simply 
the content of the thing being valued.  Previous studies have by Dolan et al (1996) and 
Lenert et al (1998) have found that the variant of SG and TTO can influence the result.  
This study finds further evidence of a variant effect and evidence that context can 
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influence the result through the ordering in which respondents undertake the tasks. 
These findings support a view that stated preference tasks such as SG, and others like 
willingness to pay (Shiell and Gold, 2002), do not simply tap into someone’s values, but 
influence the construction of those values (Slovic, 1995).  This raises serious questions 
about whether techniques such as SG elicit ‘true’ values or whether they actually shape 
them.  It has been pointed out that this alternative paradigm should not be overstated, in 
this and other studies the ordinal ranking of states has not been affected by the variant 
used (Dolan et al, 1996), but we have found evidence that the ordering of variants can 
lead to inconsistencies. 
 
A philosophy of partial perspectives (Fischhoff, 1991) lies between the extremes of the 
conventional articulated values of economists and the basic values suggested by Slovic 
(1995).  This viewpoint suggests that people do in very general terms have what 
Fischhoff (1991) refers to as ‘’stable values of moderate complexity’’.  This might 
suggest that respondents’ initial values will be strongly influenced by the elicitation 
procedure and other theoretically irrelevant considerations, but that after some 
deliberation and reflection respondents might be able to give values that are closer to the 
respondent’s basic values.  It has also been argued in the context of health state 
valuation that respondents need to be better informed about what living in the states 
might be like through the more direct input of patient values (Brazier et al, 2004), which 
again may make respondents less prone to being influenced by the valuation procedure.   
 
The values of citizens are being increasingly used to inform resource allocation in the 
public sector.  Whatever the right approach to eliciting values, the evidence from this 
and other studies suggests there needs to be a move away from large scale surveys to 
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valuing intangibles (such as health) towards a more careful and lengthier elicitation 
process that allows respondents time to reflect and deliberate on their views.   
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Table 1: Health states valued by SG variant 
SF-6D state1 State code Group 1 Group 2 
433333 
211211 
535554 
645655 
333333 
211212 
53554 
Y 
Z 
R 
P 
Q 
X 
T 
PPV2 
PPV 
PPV 
PPV 
TV 
TV 
TV 
TV 
TV 
TV 
TV 
PPV 
PPV 
PPV 
 
Where: 
1. The SF-6D has six multi-level dimensions.  Each digit in the health state represents 
the level of each dimension.  
2. PPV is ping pong variant and TV is titration variant 
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Table 2: Mean visual analogue scale rating for each health state 
 
 SF-6D 
state 
State code 
Group 1 Group 2 
111111 
433333 
211211 
535554 
645655 
333333 
211212 
535544 
H 
Y 
Z 
R 
P 
Q 
X 
T 
0.993 
0.528 
0.877 
0.306 
0.185 
0.624 
0.833 
0.373 
0.994 
0.556 
0.899 
0.298 
0.159 
0.667 
0.842 
0.380 
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Table 3: Mean standard gamble valuation for each state by group and variant 
 
PPV 
 
TV SF-6D 
state 
State code 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2 
433333 
211211 
535554 
 
645655 
 
333333 
211212 
535544 
Y 
Z 
R 
 
P 
 
Q 
X 
T 
0.647 
0.875 
0.482 
 
0.458 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.748 
0.883 
0.626 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.750 
0.882 
0.615 
0.754* 
0.913 
0.612* 
 
0.596* 
 
 
* where the difference between variants reaches significance 
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Table 4: Consistency with logical ordering 
 
Pair VAS PPV TV Group 1 Group 2  
Z>X ü  ü  ü  
Q>Y ü ü  ü   
T>R ü ü ü ü ü  
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Table 5: Degree of difficulty 
 
 PPV  
% 
TV 
% 
Very difficult 0.0 1.7 
Quite difficult 24.1 41.4 
Neither difficult nor easy 27.6 20.7 
Fairly easy 32.8 27.6 
Very easy 8.6 1.7 
Wilcoxon rank test = 0.019 
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Table 6: Understanding of task 
 
 PPV 
% 
TV 
% 
Fully understood  87.9 74.1 
Partially understood  5.2 13.8 
Did not really understand  0.0 5.2 
Wilcoxon rank test = 0.005 
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Figure 1: Example of SF-6D health state 
 
 
 
Your health limits you a little in moderate activities 
 
You accomplish less than you would like as a result of emotional problems 
 
Your health limits your social activities some of the time 
 
You have pain that interferes with your normal work (both outside the home 
and housework) a little bit 
 
Your feel tense or downhearted and low some of the time 
 
You have a lot of energy some of the time 
